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The Law of Police 
Richard H. McAdams†, Dhammika Dharmapala†† & Nuno 
Garoupa††† 
Some Fourth Amendment doctrines distinguish between searches executed by 
police and others, being more demanding of the former. We explore these distinc-
tions by offering a simple theory for how “police are different,” focusing on self-
selection. Those most attracted to the job of policing include those who feel the most 
intrinsic satisfaction from facilitating the punishment of wrongdoers. Thus, we ex-
pect police to have more intensely punitive preferences, on average, than the public 
or other governmental actors. Some experimental evidence supports this prediction. 
In turn, stronger punishment preferences logically lower one’s threshold of doubt—
the perceived probability of guilt at which one would search or seize a suspect. 
That police have a lower threshold of doubt plausibly justifies more judicial scru-
tiny of police searches than of nonpolice searches (as well as more-permissive rules 
when police perform tasks outside the scope of law enforcement). We also consider 
and critique Professor Bill Stuntz’s alternative explanation of the relevant doctrine.  
INTRODUCTION 
Are police different? Are law enforcement officials sufficient-
ly different from other governmental actors that legal rules 
should ever distinguish between the actions of the police and the 
same actions undertaken by other governmental actors? Or 
should the law refuse to draw any such distinctions, treating po-
lice as identical to other governmental actors in all circumstanc-
es? We think it is plausible to say that the law should draw no 
distinctions whatsoever, as most Fourth Amendment case law 
indicates. We wish to argue, however, that police are important-
ly different and that this difference should be given some weight 
in legal analysis. Recognizing this difference will sometimes 
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06 MCADAMS_SYMP_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015 9:39 AM 
136  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:135 
   
suggest rules that distinguish between governmental actors, as 
we observe in a few Fourth Amendment cases. 
In those cases in which Fourth Amendment doctrine is sen-
sitive to whether the governmental agent performing a search is 
a police officer, the doctrine demands more justification for po-
lice searches than for nonpolice searches. Nothing in the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, nor anything obvious from its original 
understanding, explains this distinction.1 So the best account—if 
there is one—is likely functional. Professor Bill Stuntz was per-
haps the first to offer such a functional theory.2 He focused at-
tention on the other “nonsearch” regulatory powers that the gov-
ernmental agent possesses.3 Stuntz contended that, when 
nonsearch powers are substantial, citizens will willingly ac-
cept—implicitly bargain for—weaker Fourth Amendment rights 
to forestall other, less desirable forms of regulation.4 In this  
Essay, we critique Stuntz’s explanation and offer our own. We 
do not seek to resolve all the doctrinal issues that arise along 
the way; we hope to defend only the plausibility of legal rules 
that demand more of police than of other governmental actors. 
Our claims are positive and normative. Our positive claim is 
that the people who become police officers differ, on average, 
from the people who become other governmental employees and, 
more generally, from the public. Various mechanisms might 
produce this difference, but we explore only one possibility that 
we believe is important: self-selection. Self-selection for policing 
might generate differences on any number of dimensions. For 
simplicity’s sake, we emphasize a single dimension: those who 
select into the job of policing have more intensely punitive pref-
erences than those who select into other government jobs. 
Our normative claim begins with this observation: the in-
tensity of one’s punishment preferences logically affects one’s 
threshold of doubt—the perceived probability of guilt at which 
one would take action, such as a search or an arrest, against a 
 
 1 See US Const Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 2 See generally William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 Stan L Rev 553 (1992). 
 3 See id at 566. 
 4 See id at 555. 
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suspect. The hypothesis that law-enforcement officers have more 
intensely punitive preferences than other governmental actors 
(or the public) implies that the former group will have a lower 
threshold of doubt for searches and seizures. That lower thresh-
old is one factor weighing in favor of greater scrutiny of police, 
rendering plausible a doctrinal rule that is more demanding of 
police searches than of nonpolice searches. Of course, many fac-
tors influence the best functional rule for searches and seizures, 
including simple matters of administrability.5 Differences in po-
lice preferences need not justify a completely different Fourth 
Amendment regime for police because these differences must be 
balanced against other factors. We will not conduct the balanc-
ing in this Essay; we argue only that police-specific rules are 
normatively defensible. 
We present our claims in three parts. First, we identify 
some puzzling doctrinal differences between the treatment of po-
lice and other governmental searchers. Second, we present our 
theory of punitive police, which not only explains the doctrinal 
differences but also solves a related puzzle—why courts distin-
guish between police work involving law enforcement and other 
forms of police work. Third, we describe and critique the best al-
ternative account, Stuntz’s implicit-bargain theory. 
I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND 
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENTS 
Fourth Amendment law has sometimes treated police dif-
ferently than other governmental actors, though more often in 
the past than the present. The most obvious contemporary ex-
amples involve the regulation of public school students and pub-
lic employees. In New Jersey v T.L.O.,6 the US Supreme Court 
upheld the search of a teenager’s purse by a public-high-school 
principal based on “reasonable grounds”7—a lower standard of 
suspicion than the probable cause standard, which would have 
been needed to justify a police officer’s search of the same purse 
(a warrant may also have been needed).8 In two later cases, the 
Court upheld high school programs that required students to 
 
 5 See Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S Ct 
1510, 1522 (2012) (“Officers who interact with those suspected of violating the law have 
an ‘essential interest in readily administrable rules.’”) (citation omitted). 
 6 469 US 325 (1985). 
 7 Id at 342. 
 8 See id at 342–43. 
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submit to random drug testing in order to participate in extra-
curricular activities, even though it would violate the Fourth 
Amendment for police to administer such tests.9 
When the government is an employer, as when it operates a 
public hospital, its searches of employee spaces—for example, 
enclosed offices, individual desks, and lockers—are governed by 
the Fourth Amendment.10 Nonetheless, the Court has applied a 
lower standard to governmental searches of employees’ private 
spaces than the warrant-and-probable-cause standard that it 
would ordinarily require for police searches.11 For example, the 
Court upheld Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regula-
tions that required railroads to test their employees for drugs 
and alcohol after certain safety incidents.12 Though the Court 
would ordinarily require individualized suspicion and a warrant 
for such intrusions, it did not impose such a requirement for 
searches performed pursuant to the FRA regulations.13 
In these cases, the Court typically uses the terminology of 
“special needs” to justify its decision.14 “Special” does not refer to 
 
 9 See Board of Education v Earls, 536 US 822, 826, 830 (2002) (holding that the 
school district did not violate the Fourth Amendment by requiring students to consent to 
random drug testing in order to participate in any extracurricular activity); Vernonia 
School District 47J v Acton, 515 US 646, 650, 664–65 (1995) (holding that the school dis-
trict did not violate the Fourth Amendment by requiring student athletes to submit to 
random drug testing). There are other ways to read these cases—emphasizing the con-
text of schools, for instance—but we note that the Earls Court relied on the fact that “the 
test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority,” thus creating an  
affinity with other cases in this discussion. Earls, 536 US at 833. 
 10 See O’Connor v Ortega, 480 US 709, 715–17 (1987) (O’Connor) (plurality). 
 11 See id at 725–26 (holding that public employers are subject to a reasonableness 
standard under the Fourth Amendment regarding the inception and scope of work-
related searches of private spaces). See also City of Ontario, California v Quon, 560 US 
746, 760–61 (2010) (explaining that a workplace’s “special needs” justify an exception to 
the general rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 678–79 
(1989) (“Where the Government requires its employees to produce urine samples to be 
analyzed for evidence of illegal drug use, the collection and subsequent chemical analysis 
of such samples are searches that must meet the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). One can read these cases as instead drawing a line based on the 
purpose of the search—to facilitate law enforcement or workplace efficiency—which hap-
pens to correlate with the identity of the governmental agent. See Ortega, 480 US at 724. 
We address the purpose distinction below. See Part II.C. 
 12 Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 US 602, 608, 633 (1989). 
 13 See id at 624 (“In limited circumstances . . . a search may be reasonable despite 
the absence of [individualized] suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in 
question here.”). 
 14 See, for example, id at 620 (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct 
of railroad employees to ensure safety . . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law 
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause  
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an especially powerful need. When the Court allows a principal 
to search a student’s purse, it is not because the need to enforce 
school rules against tobacco use, for instance, is more important 
than the need to enforce criminal laws. For drug tests of stu-
dents or employees, the social interest is the same regardless of 
who administers the tests: teachers, bureaucratic supervisors, or 
police officers. The same is true if the search aims to find stolen 
property—the interest is identical whether the police or some 
other governmental agent conducts the search. In each of these 
cases, the innocent party’s privacy interest against governmen-
tal intrusion is also equally strong. Thus, it is puzzling that the 
Court distinguishes the levels of justification required for these 
searches. 
Beyond current doctrine, there are interesting historical ex-
amples. In the since-overruled case of Frank v Maryland,15 the 
Supreme Court upheld warrantless administrative searches of 
homes “as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for the general wel-
fare of the community and not as a means of enforcing the crim-
inal law.”16 Notably, the governmental agent conducting the 
search was a city health inspector, not a police officer.17 
Consider also a recently abandoned distinction in the law of 
the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court first recognized the 
“good faith” exception thirty years ago in United States v Leon.18 
In Leon, police officers relied on a warrant that a court later de-
clared invalid for want of probable cause.19 Subject to some con-
ditions, the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule was inappro-
priate in this case because the police relied on the magistrate’s 
assessment of probable cause.20 The Court noted that “the exclu-
sionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than 
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates,” and that there 
was “no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are  
 
requirements.”) (quotation marks omitted); Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 876 (1987) 
(mentioning the “special needs” of Wisconsin’s probation system); Ortega, 480 US at 725 
(referencing the “special needs” of the workplace); T.L.O., 469 US at 332 n 2 (discussing 
the “special needs” of the school system). 
 15 359 US 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v Municipal Court of San Francisco, 
387 US 523, 528 (1967). See also See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541, 546 (1967) (holding 
that code-enforcement inspections of commercial structures without a warrant violate 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 16 Frank, 359 US at 367. 
 17 Id at 361. 
 18 468 US 897 (1984). 
 19 Id at 902–03. 
 20 Id at 905, 919–21. 
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inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that law-
lessness among these actors requires application of the extreme 
sanction of exclusion.”21 The implication is that such evidence 
does exist for police. The Court later distinguished police from 
legislators, rejecting the exclusion of evidence in Illinois v 
Krull,22 in which the police relied on a state statute that author-
ized their search, even though a court had subsequently held the 
statute unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.23 
After Krull, the good faith exception appeared to depend on 
whether police were the ultimate source of the governmental  
error that produced the Fourth Amendment violation.24 Arizona 
v Evans25 seemed to confirm this view. In that case, the Court 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule when police relied on a 
database that erroneously indicated the existence of an arrest 
warrant.26 A clerk made the error—possibly in the sheriff’s  
office, but probably in the court’s office.27 Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist extended Leon to these facts, reasoning: “Application 
of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the 
exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.”28 In Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which was 
joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and David Souter, she said 
that the majority opinion “[p]rudently . . . limit[ed] itself to the 
question whether a court employee’s departure from such estab-
lished procedures is the kind of error to which the exclusionary 
rule should apply.”29 
Thus, for many years, the good faith exception bypassed the 
exclusionary rule when legislative or judicial personnel, includ-
ing clerical staff, were ultimately responsible for the Fourth 
Amendment violation, but not—as conventionally understood—
when police personnel, including clerical staff, were ultimately 
responsible. The line between clerks working for police and 
 
 21 Id at 916 (emphasis added). See also Massachusetts v Sheppard, 468 US 981, 
990–91 (1984). 
 22 480 US 340 (1987). 
 23 Id at 351, 353. 
 24 See id at 350 (discussing the Court’s reasoning in Leon and stating that 
“[p]enalizing the officer for [another governmental branch’s] error, rather than his own, 
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations”)  
(quotation marks omitted). 
 25 514 US 1 (1995). 
 26 Id at 3–4. 
 27 Id at 5. 
 28 Id at 16 (emphasis added). 
 29 Evans, 514 US at 16 (O’Connor concurring) (emphasis added). 
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clerks working for courts is obviously a thin one, but if there is a 
distinction between police and other governmental agents, some 
employees will inevitably be difficult to classify. One might dis-
tinguish field officers from other law enforcement employees, 
but some justices thought that it was useful to draw a sharp line 
between all police employees and all other governmental  
employees.30 
More recently, the Supreme Court has turned sharply 
against the exclusionary rule in a series of cases,31 one of which 
abandoned the police/nonpolice distinction. The facts in Herring 
v United States32 were similar to those in Evans, except that the 
database error in the former—erroneously indicating that an ar-
rest warrant existed—was clearly the result of a mistake by po-
lice clerical personnel.33 Two of the four dissenters, Justices 
Breyer and Souter, emphasized the importance of maintaining 
the distinction between police errors and nonpolice errors.34 The 
majority articulated a much narrower, more exceptional role for 
the exclusionary rule.35 
Nonetheless, the longevity of the distinction and the doc-
trines previously reviewed—Frank’s abandoned rule about ad-
ministrative searches of homes and the extant rules about 
searches in schools and government workplaces—together raise 
the question whether the law should ever distinguish between 
police and other governmental actors. 
  
 
 30 See id at 14–15 (majority). 
 31 See, for example, Davis v United States, 131 S Ct 2419, 2423–24 (2011) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a search conducted 
in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, even when the precedent is later 
overruled); Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586, 594 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule, be-
cause the rule is not intended to protect a suspect’s interest in keeping evidence from the 
government). 
 32 555 US 135 (2009). 
 33 Id at 138. 
 34 See id at 158–59 (Breyer dissenting). 
 35 See id at 147–48 (majority) (“[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the 
result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless 
disregard of constitutional requirements . . . the criminal should not ‘go free because the 
constable has blundered.’”) (citation omitted). 
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II.  AN EXPLANATION: PUNITIVE POLICE 
Should the Fourth Amendment sometimes treat police dif-
ferently than other governmental actors? Our reason for answer-
ing in the affirmative is simple: police are different. The courts 
sometimes find this difference sufficiently important to craft dif-
ferent legal rules for police searches and nonpolice searches. 
A. Self-Selection Yields Punitive Police 
Why are police different? One type of answer (raised by par-
ticipants at the symposium) involves incentives external to po-
lice officers. Political officials or police management exert pres-
sure on patrol officers, possibly through implicit quotas for 
arrests or stops.36 We do not pursue this line of analysis. Exter-
nal incentives do not obviously explain how police differ from 
nonpolice actors, who are also subject to external incentives and 
political pressures.37 Even if the external incentives motivating 
police are, in many cases, more intense than those facing other 
governmental agents, the incentives explanation strikes us as 
incomplete. It has worked well for New York City during the 
past two decades, as well as for a few other times and places, but 
for many decades in many American cities, there was no 
CompStat and no strong top-down pressure to achieve some 
number of stops and arrests per week.38 We think that the po-
lice/nonpolice distinction matters across time periods and juris-
dictions, so we look elsewhere for a more general explanation. 
Another external factor is organizational culture, through 
which individual officers are socialized into the profession and 
 
 36 See Al Baker and Liz Robbins, A Quota by Any Other Name, NY Times City 
Room Blog (NY Times, Jan 13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/7DTY-H3KA (describ-
ing the NYPD’s de facto use of quotas despite their illegality); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, 
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum L Rev 
1655, 1695 n 187 (2010) (collecting examples of reported quota use). 
 37 For instance, teachers are evaluated in part by their students’ standardized-test 
results, which may pressure teachers to use searches to rid the school of drugs and other 
distractions. Governmental employers also face budgetary pressures to rid themselves of 
subpar employees. See generally Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the 
Hunger Games: The Brutal Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given 
Municipal Securities Debt, Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 Rev 
Bank & Fin L 663 (2014). 
 38 See generally Nathaniel Bronstein, Note, Police Management and Quotas: Gov-
ernance in the CompStat Era, 48 Colum J L & Soc Probs (forthcoming 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/499B-2BLV (discussing police-department activity quotas and their nega-
tive effects, using the NYPD as an example). 
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into the norms of their particular police force or station house.39 
Although promising, we do not pursue this line of analysis. One 
reason is that organizational culture influences all governmen-
tal employees, so this proposition just raises the difficult ques-
tion of why police culture differs from nonpolice culture.40 In the 
end, we believe that our internal explanation based on self-
selection is complementary to any organizational explanation. 
Our theory of self-selection focuses on the characteristics of 
the individuals who become police officers. Although individuals 
must qualify for the job, they must also apply for it. Thus, they 
self-select by seeking one job rather than another.41 Given two 
job opportunities with similar material benefits, people select  
into the job with greater intrinsic benefits.42 What is intrinsical-
ly satisfying for one person may be intrinsically neutral or even 
costly to another. As a result, individuals attracted to policing 
are different from people attracted to government jobs like social 
worker, librarian, or environmental engineer.43 
One might imagine that any number of individual  
characteristics could cause some people to value the job of polic-
ing more than the average person and to select into it according-
ly. Plausible candidates might include those with an appetite for 
risk, those who value order and authority, or those who like to 
work outside. For simplicity’s sake, we emphasize a single  
characteristic: a heightened preference for punishing. An inter-
esting experimental literature documents the unsurprising  
fact that human beings have a preference for punishing  
 
 39 See James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and 
Order in Eight Communities 140, 157 (Harvard 3d ed 1969); Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, Two 
Cultures of Policing: Street Cops and Management Cops 1–16, 121–26 (1983); John Van 
Maanen, Observations on the Making of Policemen, 32 Hum Org 407, 408 (1973). 
 40 In addition, organizational culture should produce greater homogeneity over 
time within a police force or station house, but it does not obviously predict the direction 
of that influence. It would seem that culture could make police more observant than oth-
er governmental actors of Fourth Amendment rights. 
 41 A variety of intrinsic preferences may influence self-selection across occupations. 
For a broad model, see generally Canice Prendergast, The Motivation and Bias of  
Bureaucrats, 97 Am Econ Rev 180 (2007). For a model of punitive policing, see generally 
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno M. Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? 
Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure (Illinois Public Law Research 
Paper No 13-47, June 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/LV7D-99E7. 
 42 See Dharmapala, Garoupa, and McAdams, Punitive Police? at *24–25 (cited in 
note 41). 
 43 See Prendergast, 97 Am Econ Rev at 191–92 (cited in note 41) (contrasting the 
typical characteristics of police officers and social workers). 
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transgressors—individuals who behave unfairly or wrongly.44 
Humans are willing to incur costs to make sure that punishment 
occurs. Economists call the preference one for “altruistic pun-
ishment,” because individuals exhibit a willingness to punish 
transgressors even when doing so creates no possible gain for 
the individual other than satisfying the revealed preference for 
punishment.45 (In the experiments, punishment is allowed at the 
end of the experiment, when it is too late to prospectively influ-
ence experimental behavior.)46 Indeed, people are willing to in-
cur these costs even when they are not a victim of the  
transgression.47 
The job of policing offers an unusual set of opportunities to 
punish a suspect, either directly or indirectly. Obviously, the po-
lice have the opportunity to cause punishment. A successful po-
lice investigation or arrest may eventually produce a conviction 
and a criminal sentence. Moreover, the pretrial criminal pro-
cesses that the arrest triggers—booking, detention, and required 
court appearances—are commonly experienced as punitive.48 But 
there is no reason to think that the human preference for pun-
ishment is limited to sanctions formally imposed by the state. In 
an important sense, the police themselves frequently inflict pun-
ishment when they manhandle a suspect during a stop or arrest, 
seize or destroy valuable property, or verbally humiliate a sus-
pect in public. In sum, police can indirectly cause or directly in-
flict punishment with a frequency and intensity that few other 
 
 44 See, for example, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, Human Altruism—Proximate 
Patterns and Evolutionary Origins, 27 Analyse & Kritik (Analyze & Critique) 6, 8 (2005) 
(“The ultimatum game . . . nicely illustrates that a sizeable number of people from a wide 
variety of cultures . . . are willing to hurt others to . . . punish unfair behaviour.”). Exper-
iments confirm this result even when the potential punisher is not himself a victim of 
the wrongdoing. See generally Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment 
and Social Norms, 25 Evol & Hum Behav 63 (2004); Joseph Henrich, et al, Costly Pun-
ishment across Human Societies, 312 Science 1767 (2006). See also Dominique J.-F. de 
Quervain, et al, The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 Science 1254, 1258 
(2004) (reporting that neural images of subjects undergoing a punishment experiment 
reveal that the effective punishment of norm violators activates a reward center in the 
brain). 
 45 See, for example, Quervain, 305 Science at 1258 (cited in note 44) (explaining the 
neural basis behind the preference for altruistic punishment). 
 46 See, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher, 25 Evol & Hum Behav at 66–67 (cited in 
note 44). 
 47 See id at 85. 
 48 For a thorough analysis of how the criminal process is really part of the punish-
ment, see Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower 
Criminal Court 199–243 (Russell Sage 1992). 
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occupations can match (perhaps only prison guards; we do not 
here explore the doctrinal implications outside police). 
By contrast, alternative government jobs such as librarian, 
social worker, environmental engineer, accountant, clerk, agri-
cultural consultant, or firefighter offer far fewer occasions for 
punishment. A teacher can verbally chastise and sanction a stu-
dent, of course, but cannot roughly tackle and handcuff the  
student, initiate the process of booking and confinement to jail 
or prison, or engage in the same verbal abuse that some police 
officers routinely dole out.  
For the individual who gains utility from punishing trans-
gressors, the punitive opportunities of policing are a job benefit, 
effectively equivalent to receiving a higher wage. If a number of 
jobs pay the same wage, but one offers more punishment oppor-
tunities than all the others, that job will attract people with 
punishment preferences. Let us reasonably assume, as the ex-
perimental evidence implies, that there is heterogeneity in the 
distribution of punishment preferences.49 We can then state the 
point in relative terms. Even if most people have some degree of 
punishment preference, the stronger one’s punishment prefer-
ence (that is, the more punitive one is), the more utility one ex-
pects to receive from being a police officer and the more attract-
ed one is to the job. Those with the most intense punishment 
preferences will be willing to take a policing job even if its nomi-
nal pay is lower than other available jobs. As a consequence, po-
lice officers will, on average, have stronger punishment prefer-
ences than the typical citizen and (most importantly for 
explaining the doctrinal puzzle) other governmental workers.50 
None of these claims is absolute. We acknowledge that some 
people with average punishment preferences will still find the 
policing job attractive, and punitive preferences are sufficiently 
common that we expect to find them, to some degree, among 
every type of governmental worker. The claim is simply one of 
overlapping bell curves: the mean or median police officer is 
 
 49 See, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher, 27 Analyse & Kritik (Analyze &  
Critique) at 26 (cited in note 44). 
 50 We also make the standard assumption that (punitive) preferences are not di-
rectly observable, so the public cannot prevent self-selection. Even if preferences were 
observable, however, citizens might prefer punitive police, despite the costs, because 
such police will work for a lower salary (given intrinsic satisfaction from the job) and 
shirk less (given that intrinsic satisfaction depends on performing the job sufficiently to 
cause punishment). See Dharmapala, Garoupa, and McAdams, Punitive Police? at *3–4 
(cited in note 41). 
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more punitive than the mean or median public school teacher, 
social worker, building inspector, or other governmental agent. 
We are most emphatically not saying that a preference for pun-
ishment is the only factor that matters to one who becomes a po-
lice officer. Undoubtedly, many factors influence the decision. 
We mentioned above the preferences for risk and for working 
outside, and we could easily add more (level of education, occu-
pation of family members, desire to serve the community, the lo-
cal unemployment rate, and so forth).51 All these factors can in-
fluence the decision to become a police officer along with the 
intensity of one’s punitive preferences. It is not as if the fact that 
police prefer risk more than other governmental workers means 
that police cannot also be more punitive. Indeed, some of the al-
ternative accounts that one could give—for example, that indi-
viduals drawn to policing are more likely to be physically ag-
gressive or have authoritarian personalities52—would entirely 
support and reinforce the point that we are making. 
In the end, our positive claim about police is an empirical 
conjecture. However, it is reassuring that two very recent pun-
ishment experiments found some direct support for the proposi-
tion that police are more punitive.53 In one, researchers used a 
unique subject pool that included eighty-seven French police 
commissioners and individuals who had recently passed the 
competitive national exam and were on their way to becoming 
 
 51 Like most economic analysts, we are skeptical of self-reported motivations, espe-
cially when the most popular answer—“opportunity to help people in the community”—is 
obviously self-serving. See, for example, Anthony J. Raganella and Michael D. White, 
Race, Gender, and Motivation for Becoming a Police Officer: Implications for Building a 
Representative Police Department, 32 J Crim Just 501, 506 (2004) (reporting that the av-
erage intensity for this motivation was 2.61 out of 3, where 3 means “very influential”). 
Nonetheless, “to fight crime” is the fifth-ranked–self-reported motivation (2.33 out of 3). 
Id. The separate motive “to enforce the laws of society” is self-reportedly of moderate im-
portance (2.02 out of 3). Id. 
 52 See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich L Rev 1699, 1733 & n 
194 (2005) (acknowledging the belief that “the psychology of the police was shaped not 
just by occupational role . . . but also by a cluster of dispositions that officers brought 
with them to the job,” such as the “view [of] violence as legitimate” and “a preoccupation 
with maintaining self-respect [and] proving one’s masculinity”) (citations omitted). 
 53 See generally David L. Dickinson, David Masclet, and Marie Claire Villeval, 
Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners 
(GATE Working Paper 1416, May 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D242-9MGJ; Guido 
Friebel, Michael Kosfeld, and Gerd Thielmann, Sorting of Motivated Agents: Evidence 
from Applicants to the German Police, Goethe University Frankfurt mimeo (2013) (on file 
with authors). 
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commissioners.54 Police and other subjects participated in the 
standard experimental games for testing preferences to punish 
socially bad behavior (when punishment is costly and without 
strategic benefit).55 The researchers found that “police subjects 
. . . enforce norms with punishment significantly more than non-
police subjects.”56 The other study achieved similar results with 
German high school students who had applied for jobs as police 
officers.57 
B. Punitive Police Search and Seize Excessively 
That police have elevated punitive preferences is highly 
consequential in a way that may not be immediately obvious: 
the preference plausibly affects the appropriate threshold of 
doubt for acting on one’s suspicions. To take a familiar example, 
there are four possible outcomes at trial: convict the guilty, con-
vict the innocent, acquit the guilty, and acquit the innocent. 
Weighing the benefit of the correct results and the costs of the 
incorrect results affects the probability threshold that one 
should use for conviction. For example, if convicting the innocent 
is thought to be much worse than acquitting the guilty, when 
 
 54 See Dickinson, Masclet, and Villeval, Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas at 
*11 (cited in note 53). 
 55 See id at *6. 
 56 Id at *20. In a condition that permitted rewards but not punishment, the study 
also found that police subjects were more likely to reward nonviolators (when rewards 
were also costly and without strategic benefit). Id at *20–21. The gap between police and 
other subjects was larger, however, for punishment than rewards. Id at *20 (showing 
that subjects are more willing to punish group members when the sanction institution is 
implemented exogenously, while an endogenous reward institution marginally increases 
the likelihood of rewarding group members). Also, when subjects were given the oppor-
tunity to vote for a punishment or reward mechanism—rather than have the experi-
menter impose one—a larger proportion of police voted for punishment than did other 
subjects. Id at *21–22 (“[P]olice subjects exhibit a higher preference for sanctions com-
pared to others.”). While the results regarding rewards are interesting, we view the pun-
ishment finding as most relevant, given that law enforcement is generally structured as 
a punishment system. The French results could be attributable either to self-selection or 
police training. In a second study, Friebel, Kosfeld, and Theilmann addressed this con-
cern by using German high school students who had applied to join the police forces but 
had undergone no police training as the “police” subjects. Friebel, Kosfeld, and Thiel-
mann, Sorting of Motivated Agents at *28–29 (cited in note 53). Compared to nonappli-
cant high school students, the police-applicants were willing to incur greater costs to 
punish, suggesting that self-selection plays a major role in the punitive preferences of 
police. See id at *39. 
 57 See generally Friebel, Kosfeld, and Theilmann, Sorting of Motivated Agents  
(cited in note 53). See also note 56. 
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the weights of the correct outcomes are equal, one can logically 
derive a higher threshold of certainty for convicting. 
To illustrate, suppose that A values the correct outcomes—
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent—at zero (mere-
ly for convenience of exposition), while valuing a wrongful con-
viction at −10 and a wrongful acquittal at −1. If A focuses only 
on these costs, it would take a guilt probability of at least 91 
percent before her expected returns from convicting exceeded 
those from acquitting.58 On the other hand, if B values wrongful 
acquittals at −5 instead of −1 and all other values remain equal, 
B should convict if the probability of guilt is merely 67 percent 
or higher. The same logic applies to determining the probability 
threshold for a search or seizure. For a mere search, the proba-
bility threshold should be lower, but it still depends on the value 
that one attaches to each of four possible outcomes: searching 
the guilty, searching the innocent, not searching the guilty, and 
not searching the innocent. 
Consider the effect of punitive preferences. If two people are 
identical in all respects except punishment preferences, the per-
son with a more intense punishment preference accrues a higher 
benefit from convicting the guilty and a higher cost from acquit-
ting the guilty (while attaching the same benefit and cost to the 
other two outcomes). In the above example, we can explain the 
difference between A and B by saying that B has stronger pun-
ishment preferences, represented by the higher cost attached to 
acquitting the guilty. As a result, B rationally prefers a lower 
threshold of doubt—the probability of guilt at which B convicts, 
searches, or seizes. 
Now we can offer a simple explanation of the doctrinal dis-
tinction between police and other governmental actors. Even if 
many factors influence the decision to become a police officer, po-
lice are likely more punitive than other governmental actors or 
the public, and therefore they likely have lower thresholds of 
doubt for searches and seizures. Thus, police require more judi-
cial monitoring and scrutiny than other governmental actors.  
 
 58 For instance, if she were only 80 percent certain of guilt, then the results of con-
viction are an 80 percent chance of convicting the guilty (valued at 0) and a 20 percent 
chance of convicting the innocent (valued at −10), for an expectation of −2. Compare this 
with the expected results of acquitting: a 20 percent chance of a rightful acquittal (worth 
0) and an 80 percent chance of a wrongful acquittal (worth −1), for an expectation of 
−0.8. The latter is higher than the former, so A should acquit. 
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One might object that judges, who select into a profession 
that sentences convicted criminals, will be just as punitive as po-
lice, in which case the pessimist would deny that judicial review 
offers meaningful scrutiny. First, even if judges were equally 
punitive on average, some would still be less punitive than some 
police, and it would still make policy sense to permit judges to 
monitor and discipline police. Under this assumption, judicial 
monitoring would be insufficient to restrain police to the level 
that the citizenry desires, but such monitoring would still be 
better than nothing. Second, judges are unlikely to be as puni-
tive as police. Elections tend to weed out judges who are more 
punitive than the public, while judicial appointments carry such 
prestige (and the job involves so much more than criminal sen-
tencing) that the least-punitive lawyers are just as likely to pur-
sue and accept the opportunity. Moreover, judges may perceive 
themselves as playing a weaker causal role in punishment, di-
minishing the intrinsic utility of punishing. Police legally choose 
whether to make an arrest59 and detectives can, by expertise and 
effort, resolve cases that would otherwise go unsolved. Judges, 
on the other hand, are obligated to sentence a convict and rarely 
produce an otherwise-unobtainable sentence, especially when 
bound by plea bargains or the Sentencing Guidelines.  
In short, after balancing other considerations, judicial rules 
may sensibly scrutinize police behavior more strenuously than 
the same behavior by other governmental officials. 
C. Explaining a Related Doctrinal Puzzle 
The punitive-police theory explains another doctrinal puz-
zle: Fourth Amendment law is more deferential to police when 
they engage in activities with a primary purpose other than 
criminal-law enforcement. For example, if police want to enter a 
home without consent to find evidence of a crime and face an ex-
igent circumstance like the imminent destruction of evidence 
(which excuses a warrant), then they need probable cause to be-
lieve that the home contains such evidence.60 But if police want 
to enter a home because they suspect that someone is in imme-
diate need of medical care or rescue from danger, then they need 
 
 59 See Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior at 6–7 (cited in note 39); Joseph Gold-
stein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in 
the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L J 543, 552–54 (1960). 
 60 See Kentucky v King, 131 S Ct 1849, 1856–57 (2011). 
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only meet a lower standard of a “reasonable basis” for the be-
lief.61 The latter activity is known as “community caretaking.”62 
We see this distinction again in the roadblock cases. If the 
primary purpose of a roadblock is “ordinary law enforcement,”63 
such as the detection of narcotics (and assuming that there is no 
exigency such as an escaped prisoner), the Fourth Amendment 
forbids the roadblock because it inevitably seizes motorists ab-
sent “individualized” suspicion.64 Yet if the primary purpose is 
one other than ordinary law enforcement, such as removing 
drunk drivers from the road, then the Court is willing to engage 
in a balancing test, under which it has upheld some such check-
points.65 Removing drunk drivers from the road may seem like 
law enforcement (because it terminates ongoing crimes), but the 
point is that the removal of drunk drivers generates immediate 
protection for the public independent of (and in the absence of) 
any arrest or prosecution. As long as the primary—even if not 
the exclusive—purpose is the benefit that accrues without arrest 
or prosecution, it is not the “ordinary interest” in crime control.66 
It is a puzzle why courts would want to draw this line. It 
seems inexplicable from an efficiency perspective, because ordi-
nary law enforcement needs may be more important than some 
special needs.67 But our punitive-police theory explains the dis-
tinction in two ways. First, police officers engaged in  
community-caretaking activities will not anticipate a significant 
likelihood of arrest or punishment. Thus, their threshold  
 
 61 See Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 406 (2006). 
 62 See Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 441 (1973) (“Local police officers . . . en-
gage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking func-
tions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relat-
ing to the violation of a criminal statute.”). 
 63 But see Illinois v Lidster, 540 US 419, 427–28 (2004) (limiting the ordinary-law-
enforcement rule in the context of a roadblock aimed at gathering information about a 
criminal suspect at large rather than targeting the occupants of stopped vehicles). 
 64 City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32, 41–42 (2000) (“We have never ap-
proved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing.”). 
 65 See, for example, Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444,  
455 (1990). 
 66 A third example is the inventory-search exception, which allows police to search 
the contents of a car that they have lawfully impounded without a warrant. Florida v 
Wells, 495 US 1, 4 (1990) (“[T]he allowance of the exercise of judgment based on concerns 
related to the purpose of an inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
The Court has emphasized that the purpose of such a search is not to find evidence of a 
crime, but to have a list of valuables left in the car in case a property dispute arises 
when the car is returned to its owner. See id at 9–10 & n 2 (Brennan concurring). 
 67 See Part I. 
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probability for entering a house will not usually be affected (that 
is, lowered) by the prospect of inflicting punishment. According-
ly, even if police are punitive, there is less divergence of prefer-
ences between the police and the public regarding the probabil-
ity required to act for the purpose of community service—for 
example, to enter a house when it appears that someone is in 
dire need of medical care. Our theory of punishment preferences 
supports the observation of then-Professor Debra Livingston in 
this context: “[T]he potential for overzealousness is often re-
duced when police serve community caretaking, as opposed to 
law enforcement ends.”68 
Second, if police are punitive, then they will not shirk as 
much as conventional economic models predict69 when executing 
the punitive parts of the job. Those parts of the job generate in-
trinsic satisfaction. But especially punitive police will shirk just 
as much as less-punitive police at the nonpunitive parts of the 
job—such as community caretaking and roadblocks—which im-
prove safety without netting arrests. Indeed, because nonpuni-
tive tasks represent an opportunity cost—diverting time from 
punishment—punishment-preferring police will shirk more 
when engaged in these tasks than punishment-neutral police. If 
this is the case, then courts will create better incentives by de-
manding less justification for the activity that punitive police 
will underperform. Imposing a higher standard for punishment 
activities than for other activities will raise the external costs to 
the police for punishment work and lower the relative costs of 
nonpunitive work, offsetting the tendency of punitive police to 
overdo the former and underperform the latter. 
III.  A CRITIQUE OF THE ALTERNATIVE: STUNTZ’S IMPLICIT-
BARGAIN THEORY 
The incomparable Professor Stuntz was perhaps the first to 
focus scholarly attention on the distinction between police and 
other governmental agents within Fourth Amendment  
 
 68 Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 
1998 U Chi Legal F 261, 265, 274 (advocating “a reasonableness approach in assessing 
police intrusions that are predominantly in service of community caretaking goals”). 
 69 For one such model, see Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary 
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 NYU L Rev 1045, 
1054–59 (1991). 
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jurisprudence.70 We offer a critique of his theory because we re-
gard it as the best alternative to our own. 
Stuntz drew specific attention to the types of power other 
than a search that governmental officials may be able to exercise 
over individuals. If the “nonsearch” authority is broad, then the 
Fourth Amendment limitation on searching may prompt the 
governmental official to shift to a different power—one not lim-
ited by the Fourth Amendment—quite possibly to the detriment 
of the targeted individuals.71 If the state finds it too difficult to 
search probationers or parolees, it can send them to or leave 
them in prison.72 If the school principal cannot search suspected 
students, he can discipline and suspend them merely on the ba-
sis of his suspicion, limited only by the minimalist standards of 
due process.73 Stuntz understood the cases, therefore, as recog-
nizing an implicit bargain: when the governmental agent has 
broad authority, the citizen gives up strong Fourth Amendment 
rights in exchange for the government not exercising other pow-
ers to circumvent those rights.74 As Stuntz put it, when govern-
mental agents have broad powers over Fourth Amendment ben-
eficiaries, “both the government and the beneficiaries of Fourth 
Amendment protection would probably prefer that the protec-
tion be minimized: if it could not search, the government would 
do something else, and the something else is often worse than 
the search.”75 
This explanation “applies mostly to cases outside of criminal 
law enforcement,”76 such that the theory explains the doctrinal 
puzzles that the prior sections of this Essay address. But Stuntz 
emphasized that his theory “does not justify a sharp legal divide 
between police and non-police searches.”77 For example, as an ex-
ceptional case that his theory explains, Stuntz defended New 
 
 70 See generally Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev 553 (cited in note 2). 
 71 See id at 569 (“[T]he alternatives to searching may well be both likely and, from 
the point of view of the people whom the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect, worse.”). 
 72 See id at 580–81 (describing this option but noting financial limitations on its 
viability). 
 73 See id at 573–74. See also Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 581 (1975) (holding that 
students facing temporary suspension have interests that qualify for Due Process Clause 
protection, including notice of the charges, an explanation of incriminating evidence, and 
an opportunity to be heard). 
 74 See Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev at 590 (cited in note 2).  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id (emphasis added). 
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York v Burger,78 which upheld a police search of a junkyard for 
stolen cars—evidence of crime—without a warrant but in com-
pliance with a statute that authorized certain warrantless 
searches of businesses.79 Stuntz argued that the police power of 
state governments to regulate business is so extensive that, if 
the courts required warrants, the government could respond, as 
a substitute, with extensive regulation giving it access to the 
same information in an even more burdensome manner.80 In 
sum: “The key is not who is doing the searching, but how the 
government is likely to react to restrictions on its ability to 
search.”81 
Stuntz’s theory is typically ingenious, but we offer reasons 
to reject it. Consider, first, the context in which the govern-
ment’s nonsearch regulation occurs after the moment at which 
its desired search would have occurred. For example, in the 
school context, Stuntz imagined that the principal disciplines 
the suspected student after the time at which the principal or 
teacher would have instead searched the student had strong 
Fourth Amendment rights not stood in the way. 
If the nonsearch regulation is ex post in this sense, our first 
objection is that Stuntz ignored the possibility of an antiretalia-
tion doctrine. Even if due process protection generally leaves 
principals with wide latitude to suspend and otherwise disci-
pline students suspected of wrongdoing, courts might have pro-
tected strong Fourth Amendment rights by forbidding principals 
from using their disciplinary powers for the purpose of retaliat-
ing against students who refused to consent to searches. Other 
areas of law facing the problem of retaliation have created such 
a doctrine, rather than simply conceding defeat and weakening 
rights so as to avoid retaliation.82 
 
 78 482 US 691 (1987). 
 79 Id at 693, 716. 
 80 See Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev at 584 (cited in note 2). 
 81 Id at 590 (emphasis added). Stuntz noted one exception to this analysis: when 
“the government targets whole classes of people,” as with categorical drug testing. Id. In 
these cases, “[t]he large number of people involved makes strategic responses by the gov-
ernment unlikely,” so the judicial protection of substantial Fourth Amendment rights is 
not likely to be circumvented. Id. 
 82 For instance, First Amendment rights are so protected. See generally Matthew 
M. Killen, Note, Intolerable Cruelties: Retaliatory Actions in First Amendment Public 
Employment Cases, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1629 (2006). Many other antiretaliation rules 
protect statutory rights. See, for example, Andrew Kenny, Comment, The Meaning of 
“Because” in Employment Discrimination Law: Causation in Title VII Retaliation Cases 
after Gross, 78 U Chi L Rev 1031, 1031 (2011) (explaining that Title VII of the Civil 
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Second, individuals cannot actually be made worse off by 
strong Fourth Amendment rights (in this ex post context) be-
cause they can waive their rights by consenting to a search.83 In 
discussing school searches, Stuntz considered but rejected the 
significance of consent. He suggested that, if the principal or 
teacher is free to treat the refusal to grant consent as an admis-
sion of guilt, then the innocent will feel compelled to consent to 
the search, thereby gaining nothing from strong Fourth 
Amendment rights.84 
This conclusion, however, does not follow. Even if innocent 
students usually prefer to allow a search, there are instances in 
which they would prefer punishment. A loss of privacy that 
might embarrass adults is even more likely to humiliate teenag-
ers, especially when the search might occur in view of other stu-
dents who would discover some reason to bully the individual 
searched. A student would presumably not violate school rules 
by carrying in his or her backpack an authorized prescription 
medication that reveals a physical or mental condition, a book 
on pregnancy or LGBTQ sexuality, a pamphlet from an abortion 
clinic, or something as seemingly innocuous as an inhaler,  
tampon, or athletic supporter. A student could rationally prefer 
detention or suspension to the public revelation of the contents 
of his or her private containers. Indeed, such a preference might 
be common.85 
The problem with Stuntz’s theory is that there is one collec-
tive bargain. One has to guess at what most students want, and 
one must impose on students with minority preferences the out-
come preferred by the majority. By contrast, with strong-but-
waivable rights, one need not guess, and those with minority 
preferences can get the outcome that they prefer (refusing the 
search and accepting the sanction), while those with majority 
preferences get their way as well (allowing the search and avoid-
ing the nonsearch sanction). 
 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 “prohibit re-
taliation against an employee ‘because’ the employee opposed a discriminatory practice”). 
 83 See Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 219 (1973) (stating that it is “well 
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent”) (citations 
omitted). 
 84 See Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev at 566 (cited in note 2). 
 85 See Safford Unified School District No 1 v Redding, 557 US 364, 375 (2009) (rec-
ognizing the humiliating effect of a search, especially considering young people’s “adoles-
cent vulnerability”). 
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Now consider a different context, in which the government 
responds to strong Fourth Amendment rights by some form of 
nonsearch regulation before the moment at which the govern-
ment’s desired search would have occurred. If businesses have 
strong Fourth Amendment rights, the government could respond 
with industry-wide regulations—for example, recordkeeping or 
reporting mandates or bans on privacy fences. These ex ante 
regulations will apply to all firms, not just those that, in a par-
ticular case, refuse to consent. So, in this scenario, the above ob-
jections do not apply: the government is not retaliating against 
the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights, and the individual 
firm cannot avoid the regulation by consenting to a particular 
search. 
We offer two new objections to the implicit-bargain theory in 
this context. First, one should worry that the argument proves 
too much. If the implicit-bargain analysis applies to a heavily 
regulated industry, then why not to a heavily regulated neigh-
borhood? Consistent with Stuntz’s later work,86 the police do 
have broad powers. They are free to flood the streets and side-
walks of a particular neighborhood with patrol officers and po-
lice dogs87 to energetically monitor for the most trivial of crimes, 
to pay informants and run undercover operations, to install se-
curity cameras88 and operate roadblocks (with a primary purpose 
other than ordinary law enforcement),89 to ask repeatedly for 
consent searches,90 and to stop-and-frisk “suspicious” individu-
als.91 Perhaps a resident would regard aggressive policing of her 
 
 86 See, for example, William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Jus-
tice, 119 Harv L Rev 780, 790–91 (2006) (explaining how “the absence of constitutional 
regulation plays a central role” in the context of police discretion) (emphasis omitted); 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 539 
(2001) (noting that police benefit from broader criminal-liability rules and providing the 
example of the Fourth Amendment—under which, if the operative word “crime” includes 
enough behavior, the police can stop or arrest whomever they wish). But see Stuntz, 44 
Stan L Rev at 589–90 (cited in note 2) (“Police officers have limited substantive authority 
over the suspects they try to catch.”). 
 87 See Ligon v City of New York, 736 F3d 118, 150 (2d Cir 2013) (discussing the 
“hot-spot policing” phenomenon, in which police make use of data to identify and focus 
resources on crime-prone areas). 
 88 For an analysis of the phenomenon of police video surveillance, see generally 
Olivia J. Greer, Note, No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 Mich 
Telecomm & Tech L Rev 589 (2012). 
 89 See Edmond, 531 US at 47–48. 
 90 See Megan Annitto, Consent Searches of Minors, 38 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 1, 
28 (2014) (discussing cases in which officers misrepresented their ability to get a warrant 
and “asked for consent repeatedly” after the individuals had refused). 
 91 See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 10 (1968). 
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neighborhood in this manner—partially constrained by strong 
Fourth Amendment rights—as worse than less-aggressive polic-
ing partially constrained by only weak Fourth Amendment 
rights. Implicit-bargain theory seems to justify a fairly radical 
abandonment of basic requirements like probable cause for ar-
rest or a warrant to search a home on the ground that strong 
Fourth Amendment rights trigger an aggressive police response. 
As a second objection in this ex ante context, implicit-
bargain theory requires, contrary to fact, that citizens actually 
receive something in return for surrendering a higher level of 
Fourth Amendment protection. To make the point, let us trans-
late the implicit-bargain theory into a rank ordering of out-
comes. As translated here, Stuntz proposed that most individu-
als rank the possibilities in this order: 
1. Strong Fourth Amendment rights and minimal nonsearch 
regulation. 
2. Weak Fourth Amendment rights and minimal nonsearch 
regulation. 
3. Strong Fourth Amendment rights and intensive nonsearch 
regulation.92 
Stuntz’s claim is that the first option is politically infeasible 
in many cases because courts will not seriously scrutinize most 
nonsearch regulation (for example, the principal suspending the 
suspected student, the government firing the suspected employ-
ee, or the government heavily regulating an entire industry).93 If 
political reality removes the first option, then we can give the 
citizens only their second-best outcome. Stuntz then argued that 
citizens rank as second-best the outcome of weak Fourth 
Amendment rights combined with minimal nonsearch  
regulation.94 
Once we rank the options explicitly, however, we see that 
this analysis omits a logical fourth possibility: 
4. Weak Fourth Amendment rights and intensive nonsearch 
regulation. 
Stuntz assumed that courts will not impede governmental 
actors from engaging in certain kinds of nonsearch regulation, in 
 
 92 See Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev at 561–62 (cited in note 2) (explaining the balancing of 
options that takes place and laying out how the government and innocent suspects would 
bargain for various formulations of search rules). 
 93 See id at 575–76, 584. 
 94 See id at 576. 
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which case there is nothing to prevent the government from ac-
cepting the benefit of weak Fourth Amendment rights and also 
engaging in intensive nonsearch regulation. This would mean 
that, at least on some occasions, option 2 is, like option 1, politi-
cally infeasible. If the government is going to engage in inten-
sive nonsearch regulation in any event, only options 3 and 4 are 
politically feasible. Given that option 4 is, for citizens, the worst 
of both worlds, citizens prefer the option with strong Fourth 
Amendment rights (option 3). For those cases in which the gov-
ernment would prefer option 4, we need a doctrinal mechanism 
for enforcing the bargain—that is, for threatening to reinstate 
strong Fourth Amendment rights if the government engages in 
intrusive nonsearch regulation. Yet there is no hint of such a 
doctrinal wrinkle in the case law. 
As a concrete example, consider administrative searches of 
regulated businesses. Stuntz defended Burger, in which the 
Court upheld a warrantless police search of a junkyard as au-
thorized by a statute that required junkyards to make certain 
business records available for police inspection during business 
hours.95 Justice William Brennan dissented, arguing that prior 
precedent that relaxed the Fourth Amendment’s standard for 
searches of “pervasively regulated industries” did not apply here 
because New York (unlike other states) had not pervasively reg-
ulated the business of junkyards.96 Stuntz responded to this ar-
gument by claiming that the facts that Brennan pointed to—
namely, that pervasive regulation did not exist—are exactly why 
Burger was rightly decided. Stuntz reasoned: “The key is not 
whether the business is pervasively regulated, but whether it 
would be, or would be to a greater degree, if authority to search 
were restricted. If so, the targets of the searches would probably 
prefer less Fourth Amendment protection to more.”97 On this 
view, the doctrinal formula is “somewhat misstated,” because it 
should emphasize not the existence of regulation but the poten-
tial for regulation.98 
 
 95 Burger, 482 US at 703–04. See also note 78 and accompanying text. 
 96 Burger, 482 US at 720–21 (Brennan dissenting). 
 97 Stuntz, 44 Stan L Rev at 584 (cited in note 2). Note that Stuntz disregarded the 
Court’s stated concern with the diminished expectations of privacy for a regulated busi-
ness, probably because that explanation is so obviously circular. (If the court did not al-
low circumvention of the ordinary Fourth Amendment standards, the expectations would 
reemerge.) See id at 582–83. We ignore this point as well. 
 98 Id at 584. 
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Yet Burger reveals the depth of the enforcement problem for 
the implicit-bargain theory. For the theory implies not only that 
the potential of regulation is key, but also that the actuality of 
intensive regulation should work in exactly the opposite direc-
tion than it does. If the industry is already pervasively regulat-
ed, the Court should be enforcing strong Fourth Amendment 
rights; otherwise, with pervasive regulation, relaxing Fourth 
Amendment rights produces not only no gain for the citizen but 
also the worst possible outcome—ceding the government maxi-
mum power in both search and nonsearch regulation. Not only 
should, as Stuntz says, the focus be on whether there is an un-
executed threat of pervasive regulation,99 but this should also be 
the only situation in which courts relax Fourth Amendment 
rights. Once the government executes the threat by intensively 
regulating the industry, courts should reinstate the higher 
Fourth Amendment standards. Yet we observe nothing of  
the sort. 
In sum, in both the ex ante and ex post context, we think 
that there are decisive objections to the implicit-bargain theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Police are different. Because of self-selection into the job of 
policing, they are likely to have stronger punishment prefer-
ences than other governmental agents. This characteristic pro-
vides a sound functional basis for allowing legal doctrines, on oc-
casion, to distinguish between police and other governmental 
agents, demanding more justification when the police conduct a 
search. At the same time, the higher Fourth Amendment stand-
ard is necessary for police only when they are pursuing punitive 
ends by enforcing criminal law, not for other types of police 
work. 
 
 99 See note 97 and accompanying text. 
